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STATUS OF THE MEDIA INFORMATION ACCESSIBILITY AND THE CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN TANZANIA AS WEAPONS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
CORRUPTION 
 
1. Introduction: 
The Report of the Presidential Commission on Corruption commonly known as 
the Warioba Commission Report1 categorised corruption in terms of petty and 
grand corruption.  Petty corruption involves low ranking civil servants and it 
involves small sums of money.  The result of this type of corruption is that 
processing of documents and provision of other services may be delayed if the 
providers are not given something to speed up the process.  Grand corruption is 
mainly practised by politicians and high ranking public officials and it involves 
large sums of money.  Normally laws, regulations and policies are bent or 
changed to suit their demands or to create an environment conducive to such 
corruption.  Such money may be used for political purposes or deposited in local 
or foreign accounts.  Another form of categorising corruption is in terms of 
political corruption and socio-economic corruption.  Political corruption usually 
involves practices by politicians of maintaining their political positions through 
corrupt means.  The most common situation of political corruption is during 
elections when politicians strive to maintain their political positions by making 
sure that they win the elections through corrupt means including bribing voters 
with cash money or things such as clothes, bicycles and so on2. In some cases 
some incumbent Members of Parliament and even Local Government Councellors 
influence voters through long terms investment in development activities as 
construction of schools dispensaries, roads and water pipes.  Socio-economic 
corruption involves the so-called petty corruption of receiving money bribes for 
the provision of services and grand corruption for financial accumulation 
purposes. 
1 United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1996, The Presidential Commission on Corruption Report; Dar es Salaam: Government Printer. 
 
2 Mpangala, G. P., 2002, Growth of Corruption in Zanzibar Elections of 1995 and 2000; In: Chambua, S., et al (eds), 2002, Multi-
party Elections and Corruption in Tanzania: With Special Reference to the 2000 Elections; Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University 
Press.  
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Corruption is an aspect that is globally recognized as an evil and that is why most 
governments in the world have varied strategies of fighting against corruption.  
The TCCIA (The Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture) 
research report has elaborately outlined economic hazards of corruption3.  One 
hazard is that corruption reduces welfare of a society.  This is because corruption 
disrupts free market forces, it has negative effects on society’s production and that 
it diverts welfare from society to individuals.  The second economic hazard is that 
corruption results into inequitable distribution of income.  This is because few 
politicians and high ranking officials use their positions corruptly to accumulate 
wealth to the effect that an unequal distribution of income is produced in society. 
 
The third hazard is that corruption is likely to retard socio-economic development 
of a society or a country.  This is because corruption discourages the production 
of goods and services because workers at work places become discouraged and 
demoralized and thus their productivity is greatly reduced.  Again, in most cases 
wealth accumulated through corrupt means is not invested for development.  The 
tendency is for the accumulators to indulge in luxurious consumption and 
construction of luxurious buildings that have no contribution to development.  
Furthermore, corruption is likely to discourage donors from providing aid to a 
country whose corruption levels are high, and thus affect the pace of 
development. 
 
Besides the economic impact there is also a political impact of corruption.  First, 
corruption is likely to cause latent or even violent political conflicts.  This is 
because as noted above corruption results into inequitable distribution of income 
and thus resulting into a big widening gap between the rich and the poor.  Such a 
situation is likely to cause discontents which can erupt into conflicts.  Second 
political corruption in elections has dual effects.  One effect is that it causes a 
crisis of legitimacy of the elected representatives and the government. 
 
3 TCCIA, 1995, Corruption and Drug Trafficking in Tanzania: A Social Economic Analysis; Dar es Salaam: Popular Publishers Ltd.  
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In connection with that it makes the election to be not free and fair and hence 
undemocratic.  This is likely to retard the building of democracy and good 
governance.  Furthermore, political corruption has direct linkage with socio-
economic corruption.  This is because an individual who gets into a position of 
political power through corruption, let us say, in elections is most likely to 
indulge in practices of economic corruption in the course of his or her discharging 
his or her leadership duties.  In his foreword in the book titled: “Multiparty 
Elections and Corruption in Tanzania” edited by Samwel Chambua, Vincent 
Kihiyo and Gaudens Mpangala in 2002, Major General A. R. Kamazima, the 
Director General of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) had the following 
to say on political corruption: 
Corruption, viewed as a dangerous and increasingly 
widespread phenomenon of our times, is a disease of 
society, around the globe, that is particularly serious, 
critical and traumatic in political activities and obviously in 
political actors.  The loss of ethical and moral values, social 
insensivity, political violence, election fraud and 
favouratism are expressions of political corruption that 
raise doubts as to the legitimacy of a democratic political 
system.  One may ask, how can a political system have a 
solid foundation in legitimacy when political parties and 
electoral processes are the most outstanding expressions of 
political corruption?4. 
 
It has to be noted however, that the fight against corruption has for a long time 
been dominated by governments and their agencies in most countries.  In recent 
years, particularly during this era of globalization and democratization the 
positive roles of the media and the civil society in the fight against corruption has 
been internationally recognised.  On the media it has, for instance, been pointed 
out that in developed countries such as Japan, Italy, Great Britain and so on the 
role of a vigilant independent press and mass media at large is critical in helping 
to expose corrupt public and private officials. 
 
4 The book titled: Multiparty Elections and Corruption in Tanzania as indicated in footnote 2 above was a result of a joint research 
between the PCB and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam. 
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On the civil society there has been international, African and regional concerns on 
how the civil society should play a vital role in fighting corruption and promoting 
good governance.  In 1999 the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations organized a Conference on “Governance in Africa: Consolidating 
the Institutional Foundations5”.   In that conference it was pointed out that civil 
society organizations (CSOs) should be partners to the state in governance and 
that their increasing role in governance should be strengthened in the context of 
the current political transitions.  If the strengthening process succeeds the “civil 
society will have played a historic role in strengthening the institutional 
foundations of good governance in Africa”. 
 
Furthermore, the organization of African Unity (OAU) convened a special 
conference on the civil society in June 2001 titled: “OAU CIVIL SOCIETY 
CONFERENCE” in Addis Ababa.  The report of the conference shows that 
among other things great emphasis was placed on the role of the civil society in 
Africa in the promotion of democracy and good governance which includes the 
fight against corruption.  Likewise Conferences of the Great Lakes Region, one in 
2002 held in Kampala and the second in 2004 held in Arusha in September and in 
Dar es Salaam in November6 took the contribution of the civil society at a special 
position in the contribution towards peace and security and democracy and good 
governance.  Thus given the current perception of the roles of the media and the 
civil society this paper is relevant and timely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Economics and Public Administration; New  
York, 1999. 
 
6 The Kampala Conference of 2002 was organised by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and Funded by the Government of Uganda.  
The Conferences of Arusha and Dar es Salaam were sponsored by the UN and the AU and organised by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Relations, the Government of Tanzania.  The Arusha Conference gave input of the Civil Society. 
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2. Efforts of the Government of Tanzania in the Fight Against Corruption: 
The history of corruption is such that it has been growing since the time of 
independence in 1961.  Thus the government efforts to fight the evil has also been 
growing and expanding.  The establishment of the Presidential Commission on 
Corruption in 1996 followed by a comprehensive programme by the government 
established in 1999 to combat corruption were culminations of a long historical 
process of government efforts to combat corruption. The 1999 programme as part 
of the effort to implement the Warioba Commission’s report is called “The 
National Anti-Corruption Strategic Action Plan (NACSAP).  Let us have a look 
briefly at the historical perspective. 
 
The efforts began soon after independence in 1961.  At that time Tanzania 
inherited an anticorruption legislation enacted by the British colonial government 
in 1958.  This legislation is indicative of the fact that the problem of corruption 
had began during the colonial era.  Although we are not sure of the magnitude of 
corruption at that time it is asserted that much of the corruption tendencies were 
experienced at lower and middle levels of the colonial civil service.  In the late 
1960s corruption began to emerge as a serious problem.  In 1966 the Permanent 
Commission of Inquiry (Ombudsman was established as a machinery and 
mechanism to combat corruption). 
 
The first post-independence anticorruption law was passed in 1971 intended to 
arrest rapid growth of corruption after independence.  It was the Prevention of 
Corruption Act.  This law was followed by the establishment of the 
Anticorruption Squad in 1975.  However, before the measures of 1971 and 1975 
political and ideological measures had been taken in terms of the Arusha 
Declaration to establish the Policy of Socialism and Self-Reliance in 1967.  
Among other aims and objectives of the introduction of the policy of socialism 
was a response to the rapid personal enrichment that grew during this period. 
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The strategies to combat corruption during this period were not effective because 
first there was no national framework and the Anticorruption squad was a small 
unit with little capacity.  Worse still civil society organizations such as peasant 
cooperatives and trade unions were not autonomous as they were under the 
control of the state and the party.  The policy of socialism had greatly reduced and 
weakened the private sector. 
 
In 1983 the Government mounted a serious campaign against economic saboteurs 
throughout the country in order to deal with corrupt elements including black 
marketers.  This campaign arose out of the nature and character of corruption that 
grew during this period which was mainly in form of hording commodities for 
very high profit realization and illegal cross border commodities transactions.  
From the second half of the 1970s to the mid 1980s like other African countries 
Tanzania experienced a serious economic crisis which brought about this type of 
corruption.  Through the campaign a lot of horded commodities were confiscated.  
Thus in 1983 the Economic Sabotage Act was enacted but it was quickly repealed 
and replaced by the Economic and Organised Crimes Act of 1984.  This Act was 
used to carry out a national operation to root out corruption. 
 
Despite those steps corruption continued to grow and spread at all levels of the 
society.  In 1989 a team was commissioned to enquire into corruption.  The report 
of the team showed that corruption had grown to high proportions.  The next step 
by the government was taken in 1991 when the Anticorruption Squad was 
transformed into the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB).  Steps to strengthen 
the PCB were continued in 1995.  In that year the Government enacted the Public 
Leadership Code of Ethics Act No. 13 of 19957.  In the 1995 general elections 
corruption became a serious campaign issue.  Soon after having been elected 
President of the United Republic of Tanzania, President Benjamin William 
Mkapa appointed the Presidential Commission on Corruption under the leadership 
of Judge Joseph Warioba on 17th January, 1996.  The report of the Commission 
was very comprehensive and it outlined the state of corruption in the country in  
 
7 URT, 1995, The Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No. 13 of 1995: Principal Legislation (Revised Edition); Dar es Salaam 
GovernmentPrinter.
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the various Government Ministries, departments as well as other sectors of the 
economy and social services.  The report further showed that corruption had 
continued to grow and that it was entrenched in the society. 
 
It has to be noted, however, that the various anticorruption steps taken during the 
1990s as pointed above were a response to the growth of corruption under new 
conditions of rapid socio-economic and political changes and reforms from the 
late 1980s to the 1990s.  From 1986 economic reforms through Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) began to transform the economy from its state 
centred socialist orientation into liberal oriented market economy through 
liberalization and privatization.  The wave of democratization culminated into the 
introduction of the multiparty political system in 1992.  These changes brought 
about new changes of corruption in which grand corruption began to take the 
form of growth of special relationship between political leaders on one hand and 
the corrupt businessmen on the other. 
 
We take the Presidential Commission on Corruption of 1996 as a culmination in 
the government strategies because that was the beginning of very comprehensive 
strategies by the Government to fight against corruption.  It also happens that that 
was the time when corruption had reached high levels of growth, and that was the 
time of the beginning of political and socio-economic reforms.  After Tanzania 
had adopted a multiparty political system in 1992 the first multiparty elections 
were held in 1995.  During the campaigns of the elections one of the promises 
made by presidential candidates was to fight against corruption once they won the 
elections.  Thus when Benjamin William Mkapa won the elections through the 
CCM ticket in October, 1995, one of the promises he decided to implement was to 
fight against corruption and the first step was to establish the Presidential 
Commission on Corruption early 1996. 
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Under the Chairmanship of Judge Joseph Warioba it produced a very 
comprehensive report with substantial recommendations after having made a 
serious study of the situation of corruption in the country.  Following the Warioba 
Commission Report the Government began to make plans as to how best could 
the recommendations be implemented.  Among the steps taken the most important 
was the establishment of the NACSAP Programme in 1999 and the various 
mechanisms of implementing it.  In the year 2000 the Good Governance 
Coordinating Unit (GGCU) in the President’s Office under a Minister of State on 
Good Governance was established.  During the same year a directorate of 
research, control and statistics was established in the PCB to widen its scope of 
prevention functions.  Another important step was to establish the aspect of 
“Strengthening Capacities to Combat Corruption in Tanzania” (SCCCT) 
sponsored by UNDP through its Good Governance Section or Department to 
support the government in developing institutional policy for NASCAP 
implementation.  In 2001 steps were further taken to create “focal points” at each 
Ministry Department and Agency (MDA) with a focal person whose duty is to 
submit reports to be published periodically by the GGCU.  Recently the focal 
point approach has been changed now committees of about four people have been 
established instead of the focal point individuals. 
 
The NACSAP is a very comprehensive strategy of the government in the fight 
against corruption in Tanzania.  A brief on progress of good governance 
programme published by the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) in June 2001 
indicates that the NACSAP was prepared through a participatory approach 
involving the Government and the CSOs including Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs). The commitment of the government of Tanzania to fight 
against corruption is further confirmed by the fact that Tanzanian has ratified a 
number of international conventions in the fight against corruption, Which 
include the UM and AU conventions. 
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Considerable achievements have been realized.  The Warioba Report itself was an 
important aspect of national self-criticism.  About 20,000 “ghosts” have been 
removed from the civil service, 800 revenue collection officials have been 
dismissed for suspicion of corruption and senior government officials have been 
retired from ministries, departments and parastatal organizations on public 
interest.  Such steps have also been carried out on magistrates. 
 
It has further been illustrated that between 1995/96 and 2000/2001 financial years 
the number of staff removed or dismissed on ethical grounds in various departs 
was 656 in customs, 476 in VAT, 338 in Income Tax, 15 in Tax Investigations 
and 7 at the Headquarters of the Tanzania Revenue Authority.  On 12th April, 
2005 a Former Minster for Works was acquitted of corruption charges by the 
High Court and earlier acquitted by a magistrate’s court in 2003.  He was 
prosecuted with his permanent secretary and a contractor on allegations that they 
had been involved in corruption connected with road construction in 1992. 
 
Despite these achievements the period has greatly bee characterised by 
shortcomings.  First there has been little publicity on the measures taken and 
achievements made.  Thus most ordinary people have little knowledge on what 
has been going on.  Second, most of the success stories have been on petty 
corruption, and very few on grand corruption. The government has demonstrated 
apparent inability to tackle grand corruption.  Thirdly, there appears to be little 
political will to seriously fight against corruption so far.  Furthermore, the views 
of various stakeholders interviewed by a consultancy team show that corruption in 
Tanzania is still rampant and it has permeated in all sectors of the society.  There 
is a danger of taking corruption as a normal way of life of the society whose 
implications in terms of development are very serious. 
 
As the SCCCT 2004 final report indicates, although PCB has been strengthened it 
lacks the required autonomy to be able to carry out its duties independently and 
more effectively.  The PCB’s process of engaging the civil society and the private 
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sector is still weak.  The coordinating role of the GGCU needs much to be 
desired.  The quarterly reports of the GGCU have little publicity.  The MDA 
activities have not produced effective results. 
 
What appears obvious and apparent is the fact that throughout the history of the 
efforts of the state to fight against corruption there has been very little direct 
involvement of the media and the civil society.  We just see the involvement of 
CSOs in establishing the NACSAP through a participatory approach and not in its 
implementation.  In its functions the PCB is expected to involve the civil society 
but the final report of the 2004 SCCCT, UNDP sponsored study shows that the 
PCB’s process of engaging the civil society and the private sector is still weak.  In 
the following sections we shall, therefore, examine the status of the media and the 
civil society as weapons in the fight against corruption in Tanzania. 
 
3.  The Media as A Weapon in the Fight Against Corruption: 
The status of the media information accessibility presupposes existence of two 
important aspects of the media.  These include independence or freedom of the 
media and its social responsibility8.  In the history of the media in the World 
media experts have identified two theoretical frameworks.  The first framework 
constitutes theories which best work in liberal democratic or quasi-democratic 
societies.  This constitutes four models: the libertarian the social responsibility.  
The second theoretical framework constitutes theories that best work or operate in 
dictatorial or quasi-dictatorial societies.  This framework was commonly used in 
communist countries such as the Soviet Union before the disintegration of the 
communist system Eastern Europe and also in one party authoritarian regimes in 
Africa and elsewhere.  This framework constitutes two models: the authoritarian 
and the Soviet models. 
 
 
8 Ngatunga, R., 2006, “The Contribution of Newspapers Coverage in Enhancing Democratic Elections in Tanzania: A Study of 2005 
General Elections in Dar es Salaam; Dar es Salaam” M. A. Dissertation, IDS, University of Dar es Salaam. 
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History of the media in Tanzania since independence shows that after 
independence, particularly during the one party era Tanzania as well as many 
other African countries adopted the theoretical framework used in dictatorial and 
authoritarian societies.  Arising out of that the media was supposed to support the 
ruling party and the government and because of that the media came under their 
increasing control.  John Barton, quoted by Stevenson9 (1988) observed that “as 
political freedom came to Africa, press freedom disappeared”.  As a result even 
the number of media institutions in Africa got greatly reduced.  It was reported, 
for instance that the number of newspapers in Africa declined by half from 1960 
to the end of the 1970s.  In 1964 there were 220 daily newspapers, but by the 
beginning of 1977 the number was only 156.  It has also been observed that there 
were more radio stations in Africa before independence than after independence.  
For example by 1960 there were 72,000 radio stations in Africa, but that number 
greatly declined after independence.  
 
This means that after independence, particularly under one party system the media 
not only lost freedom and independence but even the number of media institutions 
got greatly reduced and put under the ownership and control of the party and 
government.  In Tanzania by 1967 there were only 4 daily newspapers and these 
were the Standard, the Nationalist, Ngurumo and Uhuru and there was only one 
radio station which is Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD).  There was no 
television station only in Zanzibar where the television station was established in 
1974.  This situation continued up to the 1980s when there were only two 
government owned newspapers, that is the Daily News and the Sunday News, two 
party owned newspapers, that is Uhuru and Mzalendo and the one government 
owned radio station (RTD).  This means that freedom of the press was greatly 
limited and under such a situation it was not easy for the media to play the role of 
a weapon in the fight against corruption. 
 
 
9 Stevenson R., 1988, Communication, Development and the Third Word: The Global Politics of Information; New York: Longman. 
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During this period of the one party system the authoritarian approach to the media 
was guided by a number of policy frameworks.  These included the Charter that 
nationalized the Daily News / Sunday News newspapers in 1970, the Information 
and Broadcasting Policy I and the Information and Broadcasting Policy II.  In 
order to foresee the implementation of these policies the ruling party, TANU, 
established a mass Media Committee. 
 
With the adoption of liberal economic and political reforms Tanzania had also to 
adopt libertarian social responsibility free press and democratic participation 
models of the media.  Economic reforms mainly began with the adoption of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) from 1986 and political reforms with 
the adoption of the multiparty political system in 1992.  However, it was mainly 
from 1992 that changes began to be observed both in terms of the number of 
media institutions and the nature of ownership and relative freedom.  In terms of 
numbers for instance in Tanzania Mainland radio stations increased from one in 
1962 to 30, and television stations from 0 to 30 by 2003 (URT, 2003a).  The 
number of daily and weekly newspapers increased from only 4 to about more than 
30 during the same period.  In terms of ownership most of these are privately 
owned. 
 
The media reforms have also concerned with efforts to improve the quality of the 
media institutions by expanding and raising training facilities for the media 
profession.  Before the 1990s Tanzania had only two mass communication 
training institutions.  These were the Catholic Church owned Nyegezi Social 
Training Institute (NSTI) which offered certificates and diplomas in journalism 
and the government owned Tanzania School of Journalism (TSJ) which also 
offered certificates and diplomas.  In 1996 the NSTI started to offer advanced 
diploma in Journalism and in 1998 it started to offer bachelor degree in mass 
communication under St. Augustine University of Tanzania (SAUT).  Later 
SAUT began to offer postgraduate masters degree in mass communication.  The 
TSJ also began to offer advanced diploma in journalism.  After its affiliation to 
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the University of Dar es Salaam it has began to offer a bachelor degree in mass 
communication.  There are also a number of other new colleges which offer 
certificates and diploma. 
 
In addition to training institutions media reforms have also given rise to the 
establishment of a number of media associations in Tanzania10. Some of these 
include the Tanzania Union of Journalism (TUJ), the Tanzania Media Women 
Association (TAMWA), the Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), the 
Environmental Journalist Association (JET), the Tanzania Media Youth 
Development Association (TEMEYODA), the Photographers Association of 
Tanzania (PAT), and the Media Owners Association (MOA). 
 
In addition to the Tanzania associations Tanzania is member of a number of 
regional media associations and institutions and which include the Media Institute 
of Southern Africa (MISA) which was established in 1992, the Southern African 
Broadcasting Association (SABA), the Nordic SADC Journalism Trust (NSJT) 
and Regional News Agencies.  All these local and international associations and 
institutions are aimed at making a contribution in terms of raising the quality of 
media communication and ensuring the growth of media freedom and 
independence and media social responsibility.  These are important qualities to 
enable the media play the role of a weapon in the fight against corruption. 
 
However, despite the reform processes the media in Tanzania is still characterised by a 
number of weaknesses and shortcomings which are likely to hinder the possibility of 
playing such an anti-corruption role much more effectively (Ngatunga, ibid: 11 and 13).  
First the high quality of the media has not been fully realized.  The tendency of the media 
owners is to hire cheap labour of people with low level training or without training at all.  
Thus many well trained and qualified journalists are forced to seek employment outside 
the media profession.  Worse still even if the media owners employ less trained and 
qualified personnel, yet most of them do not give on the job training. 
10 Ngatunga, R., op.cit, pages 11 – 13. 
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The second shortcoming constitutes lack of sufficient civic education to the 
masses which can enable them raise their knowledge and awareness on issues of 
corruption.  The lack of sufficient civic education is due to the fact that both the 
public and private media do not provide enough space for the common people and 
common people issues.  The annual report of the state of Corruption in Tanzania 
was quoted by the Poverty and Human Development Report (2003) as saying: 
“The media has been captured by the rich and powerful in politics and 
business who do not want their affairs to be critically observed, 
scrutinized and reported by the media”.  This means that there is a 
tendency whereby the rich and powerful people are shaping the 
coverage of the media through private payments to the media 
executives or individual journalists.  This means that many rich 
people get themselves covered by the mass media even if their stories 
have no news values in educating the majority of the people.  This 
situation is worsened by the fact that there is a growing tendency of 
the private media to be monopolized by a few media owners.  It is 
difficult for the media to effectively fight corruption if itself develops 
corrupt tendencies. 
 
Furthermore, despite the problem of civic education on the masses, there is 
serious problem of accessibility of the media to the masses, particularly people 
living in the rural areas.  In these areas people do not get newspapers and do not 
watch televisions sets.  At least the few who have radios can get some information 
through the radio. 
 
The other shortcoming constitutes lack of high level development of media 
independence and freedom.  There is no doubt that the media reforms discussed 
above have resulted into relative achievement of media independence and 
freedom compared to the era of one party political system.  But the level of 
freedom and independence is not enough to enable the media to play vital roles 
including the role of a weapon in the fight against corruption.  This tendency is 
much more reflected during elections.  Reports on media coverage during the 
2005 general elections shows that both the public and private media, but the 
public media in particular had a tendency of favouring the ruling party.  The 
following statement confirms this view: 
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Mass media institutions which are owned by the government despite 
the fact that they greatly improved their news on the political parties 
which participated in the elections of 2005 compared to the elections 
of 2000, yet they gave more time and space to the ruling party, CCM.  
Even the candidates of CCM were given more time compared to 
candidate of all other political parties put together.  The functioning 
of the private media was not unique as it very much depended on who 
owned the media institution.  However, most of the private media 
institutions showed tendencies of favouring the ruling party 
intentionally or due to failure of observing their responsibility” 11 
 
It was further observed that both government and private media institutions gave 
more space and time to the ruling party compared to the opposition parties during 
the elections.  For instance CCM was given 77 hours and 114 minutes by 
televisions from 18th August to 31st October, 2005.  The party that followed was 
the Civic United Front (CUF) which got only 19 hours and 6 minutes, while 
CHADEMA got only 17 hours and 40 minutes.  The situation was worse with the 
remaining political parties.  According to a United Nations Report the government 
owned media should give equal opportunity and coverage to all parties and all 
people and that such media should avoid as playing the role an instrument of 
propaganda for the government or any political party and should also avoid 
segregating some political parties and some groups in the society12.  
 
Thus lack of sufficient media freedom and independence is likely to be a big 
hindrance to the fight against corruption. Under such a situation media 
information accessibility can be greatly hampered. For the media to make 
independent investigation and inform the public on issues of corruption, 
particularly when it involves grand corruption there is need to have media which 
is of high quality, free and independent and responsible.  Otherwise the tendency 
can be investigating and informing the people only on petty corruption. 
 
11 Shoo, G., 2006, “Vyombo Vya Habari (The Media); Dar es Salaam: REDET. 
12 TEMMP, 2005, Tanzania Election Media Monitoring Project 2005; Final Report, Dar es Salaam. 
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4.  The Civil Society as a Weapon in the Fight Against Corruption: 
In examining the role of the civil society as a weapon in the fight against 
corruption we shall look at four things.  First we shall try to understand the 
concept of the civil society.  This is so because the concept has undergone a long 
historical debate and discussion.  Second, we shall look at the status of the civil 
society in Tanzania.  Third we shall look at the political position and role of the 
civil society and how it interacts with the state.  And lastly we shall examine its 
direct role as a weapon in the fight against corruption. 
 
In Africa the process of democratization from 1990 has brought a discussion and 
debate on the concept of civil society and its role in the building of democracy.  
During the debate it has been recognized that civil society is a product or 
development of state systems in the World, which resulted into the growth of 
contradictory relationship between the state and the non-state society.  It is arising 
out of such contradictory relationship that the civil society emerged in order to 
resolve the contradictions between the two13.  
 
The emergence of the civil society was, therefore, in form of institutions and 
organizations created out of the non-state society.  Friedman (1995:6-7) pointed 
out that the civil society constitutes organizations that are autonomous from the 
state and that they interact with it but without having an intention to take over the 
state.  They are basically non-government and community-based organizations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 Mpangala, G. P., 2000, Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects for Change; Dar es Salaam: 
Institute of Kiswahili Research. 
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Furthermore, civil society has been explained as an aspect where manifold social 
movements and civil organizations from all classes attempt to constitute 
themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves 
and advance their interests.  In the context of this conception broadened the 
concept of civil society by identifying a number of characteristics. One 
characteristic is that civil society is a public realm between the state and the 
family because it is distinguished from the household arena and the state.  It is 
public because also it involves collective action in which individuals joint to 
pursue shared goals. 
 
The second characteristic of civil society is that it is distinguished from political 
parties, elections and the legislature which constitute elements of political 
competition.  The third characteristic is that the civil society has special 
relationship with the state such that the legitimacy of the state should be derived 
from the civil society.  Lastly the civil society should be excluded from informal 
private trade and manufacturing entities14.  
Civil Society Organizations constitute various groupings15 are well organized 
CSOs such as trade unions and peasant cooperatives and those which are 
unorganised such as vigilante, user and burial solidarity groups.  Second, are 
groups known as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) which act as a go 
between the state and the society.  NGOs are organizations that are officially 
established and run by employed staff and well supported by local or international 
funding.  They are relatively large and well resourced. NGOs can further be 
divided into advocacy NGOs which are concerned with the influencing of public 
policy and service NGOs which are concerned with social service delivery.   
14 Bratton, M., 1994, “Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa”; In: Haberson, et al, Civil Society and the State in Africa; 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
15 Mallya, E. T., 2005, “Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) Relations With the State and Political Parties; Dar es Salaam: REDET. 
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The social service NGOs are also referred to as “operational” NGOs such as 
CARITAS,  CARE and OXFAM.   Other organizations that act as go-between the 
state and the society are known as Community Based Organizations (CBOs) or 
grassroot organizations (GROs).  These are different from NGOs because they are 
smaller and often membership based organizations operating without paid staff 
and often reliant upon donor or NGO support.  They are normally issue based. 
As regards the status of the civil society it has been pointed out that the situation 
of the Civil Society in Tanzania has not been different from most other countries 
in Africa.  The African civil society is facing many problems and that it is not 
fully developed.  However, the civil society in Africa has been growing from pre-
colonial period to the present 16.  The growth of the civil society became greater 
during the colonial period due to the colonial political oppression and 
exploitation.  The 30 years of post-independence period under one party and 
military regimes there was considerable stagnation and even retardation in the 
growth of the civil society in the continent.  It was from mid-1980s to the present 
that a new growth of the civil society in Africa has been experienced. 
Likewise in Tanzania most known civil society organizations (CSOs) were 
established during the colonial period.  In Tanzania Mainland we have examples 
of the Tanganyika Civil Servants Association (TCSA) and the Tanganyika 
African Association (TAA) formed in 1922 and 1929 respectively.  In Zanzibar 
CSOs such as the African Association, the Shirazi Association, the Arab 
Association and the Asian Association were formed.  Peasant Associations and 
cooperatives were formed from the 1920s and 1930s, particularly in cash crop 
producing areas.  The Kilimanjaro Native Coffee Growers Association formed in 
1925 and which after the Cooperative Societies Ordinance it was transformed into 
the Kilimanjaro Cooperative Union (KNCU) provides a good example.  Workers 
in various work places formed trade unions.  In 19955 the various trade unions 
came together to establish an umbrella trade union called the Tanganyika 
Federation of Labour (TFL).  During the nationalist struggle for independence  
16 Mallya, E. T., 2005, ibid, page 6. 
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most CSOs joined hands with nationalist political parties to fight for national 
independence.  This was the time when CSOs in Tanzania became very vibrant.  
As was the case with the media the period after independence up to mid-1980s the 
civil society experienced high level of state control.  It has been observed that 
after independence “the honeymoon between CSOs and the ruling party, TANU, 
was shortlived”17.  This was the period of the emergence and growth of 
ideological institutions associated with the process of nation-building such as 
national unity and national development.  Organizations such as trade unions and 
peasant cooperatives came to be affiliated to the ruling party while other 
organizations such as the Teachers Association were abolished. 
From mid-1980s Tanzania began to enter into a new phase in the development of 
CSOs.  Although the one party political system continued from mid-1980s to 
1992, yet the enthusiasm to establish more CSOs began to grow.  Among the 
factors included the peak of the economic crisis which made people take new 
initiatives, the withdrawal of the state from monopolizing the economy and the 
provision  of social services due to the SAPs, and the growing demands for 
political and socio-economic changes.  Thus the number of CSOs began to 
emerge and grow, some of which became movements demanding for democracy 
in general and multiparty politics in particular. 
The adoption of multiparty politics in July 1992 accelerated the proliferation of 
CSOs.  Between 1980 and 1993 the number of non-governmental organizations 
rose from 41 to 224 and between 1993 and 1996 the number shot up to more than 
600.  By 1998 the number had risen to more than 1,000 registered organizations.  
By 2001 the number of local and international NGOs under TANGO as an 
umbrella organization was 294 and 29 respectively.  By now (2006) there are 
more than 6,000 registered NGOs in Tanzania. 
17 Mally, E. T., 2005, ibid, page 20. 
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Furthermore, CSOs in Tanzania are placed in a number of categories.  One 
category constitutes origin of the organizations.  This means they constitute both 
local and foreign CSOs.  In terms of membership some are membership based 
while others are not membership based.  Such organizations are usually elite 
based NGOs whose structure is normally top-down.  Another categorization 
include grass-root, district, regional or national CSOs.  NGOs such as TANGO 
and TACOSODE are apex or umbrella organizations.  While some are issue 
based, others deal with a number of issues.  Another categorization is in terms of 
registration.  While some are registered, others, particularly CBOs are not 
registered18. 
Discussion of the situation of CSOs in Tanzania cannot be complete without 
examining policy issues.  It has been pointed out that the Tanzania Government 
has not an overall policy on CSOs.  Its policy is limited to NGOs and it has 
excluded other types of CSO as the following observation indicates: 
The new NGO Act seems to have singled out only one form of 
civil society organizations, NGOs, for definition, and has 
excluded other forms of association life in civil society.  Both 
the NGO policy and the new NGO law exclude from the 
definition of NGO trade unions, social clubs, and sports clubs, 
political parties, religious or faith propagating organizations and 
community – based organizations.  Although such other forms 
for example community – based organizations may not be 
formal in the legal sense they quality as civil society 
organizations nevertheless.  The National NGO Policy and the 
new NGO law clearly have exacerbated the problem of legal 
definition and classification of civil society organizations
19
. 
 
 
18 Kamata, N., 2005, “Classification of Tanzania Civil Society Organizations”; Dar es Salaam: REDET. 
19 Makaramba, R. V., 2005, “The Legal Environment of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Tanzania Mainland”; Dar es Salaam: 
REDET. 
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The above quotation indicates that the Government has no CSOs policy and an 
CSOs law, but only NGOs policy and law.  The National NGO policy was passed 
in 2001.  The policy was intended to harmonise NGO policy including reducing 
the number of institutions that register NGOs into few.  The National NGO Policy 
became the basis of enacting the NGO Act No. 24 of 2002.  The main objective of 
the NGO Act is: “An Act to provide for registration of Non-Governmental 
Organizations with a view to coordinate and regulate activities of Non-
Governmental Organizations and to provide for related matters20”.  One important 
feature of the NGO Act is that it has proposed the establishment of two important 
organs, that is the Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination Board and the 
National Council for Non-Governmental Organizations.  The former is a 
Government institution, and besides coordination of NGOs it will also be 
responsible for the registration of NGOs.  The later will be an umbrella 
organization for all NGOs.  It will also be responsible for the formulation of the 
code of conduct for NGOs. 
Both the NGO policy and the NGO Act have been highly critised by CSOs.  The 
first shortcoming is that they have excluded CSOs which are not NGOs.  This 
means that whereas there is an NGO policy and law, there is no CSOs policy and 
law except the colonial Societies Ordinance of 1954 which has now been changed 
into a Societies Act. Second the policy and the Act are said to be top-down and 
that they are against the constitution (Makaramba: 9 – 10).  The NGO Act is 
against the constitution because while the constitution stipulates freedom of 
association and assembly the Act has imposed considerable regulations and 
restrictions on NGOs and CSOs in general.  For example the NGO Coordination 
Board has been given considerable powers to approve or refuse registration of an 
NGO.  The Board has also the power of suspension or cancellation of an NGO 
that has been already registered.  The Act has also empowered the Minister to 
make regulations for NGOs. 
20 URT, 2002, The Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2002; Dar es Salaam: Government Printer. 
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The third criticism is that it has established a registration procedure which is 
cumbersome and complicated.  Although the main objective of the Act is to 
reduce the number of registration procedures, yet the Act has not repealed the 
other existing written laws dealing with registrations.  This means that there is 
still a multiplicity of registration procedures.  Another complication which has 
been created by the Act constitutes the fact that all CSOs registered under other 
laws other than the NGO Act have to apply to the Registrar for a certificate of 
compliance.  Such a certificate can only be granted after satisfying conditions for 
regulation and definition of NGO.  Worse still the NGO Act has so far not been 
operational. 
As regards the political role of the civil society and its relations with the state we 
observe a number of aspects.  We need to recognise the fact that the civil society 
can play the role of a weapon in the fight against corruption at two levels.  The 
first level involves short-term or immediate measures which include immediate 
measures such as through criticism and identifying and exposing the corrupt 
individuals or institutions.  The second level constitutes long term measures 
which include playing a political role in terms of building and consolidating 
democracy and good governance21.  It has been pointed out that democratic 
political competition requires three components, that is the state, political parties 
and the civil society.  In order to ensure participation of the people in the process 
of political competition it is necessary to forge a strong linkage between the three 
components. 
 
 
21 Mpangala, G. P., 2006, “The Civil Society”; Chapter to be published in a REDET Book on the 2005 Elections and Democratic 
Consolidation”. 
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It has to be noted, however, that for the civil society to be able to play a political 
role effectively and thus contribute to the building and consolidation of 
democracy, good governance and thus fight against corruption it needs to have a 
particular relationship with the state.  The issue of relationship between the state 
and the civil society has been a matter of long discussion and debate.  It has been 
argued that the relationship between the state and the civil society greatly depend 
on the nature and character of the state whether it is democratic, authoritarian or a 
dictatorial state.  Hegel was one of the pioneer philosophers on the understanding 
of relationship between the civil society and the state.  According to him the 
relationship constitutes the family, the civil society in the middle and the state, 
with the state being above the civil society 22.  Even if the state was above, Hegel 
saw the relationship as mutual.  Unlike Hegel, John Locke was of the view that 
the civil society should be above the state because state power can arise only out 
of the consent of individuals within the society 23. 
 
Kiondo identified three scenarios of state – CSOs relationship.  The first scenario 
constitutes a situation where the state sees the CSOs as being its partner in 
development and other state’s activities.  Thus in this scenario CSOs are seen as 
being supportive of the state.  Such activities include those related to advocacy 
and social welfare.  The second scenario is where the state sees the CSOs 
activities as a threat to its interests.  In most cases such activities include those 
which tend to provide political platform to political opponents, real or imagined.  
In most cases human rights CSOs and those dealing with gender sensitization 
happen to be viewed as a threat by the state.  The third scenario is one in which 
the state feels that national security is at risk due to activities of some CSOs.  In 
most cases these include externally funded CSOs including those that are 
established to carry out some political role such as observing and monitoring 
elections. 
 
22 Mhina, A., 2005, Meaning and Scope of Civil Society: Theoretical Literature; Dar es Salaam: REDET. 
23 Sabine, G., 1973, Political Theory; Ithaka. 
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The three scenarios of CSOs – state relationship discussed above show that 
depending on the nature and character of activities of CSOs, relationship with the 
state can be harmonious and in form of partnership or it can be confrontational.  
Current thinking tends to indicate that there is need for as much as possible for the 
relationship to be that of partners in development and other activities regardless of 
the nature of activities of CSOs.  Some activities of CSOs cannot avoid being 
political, and therefore, such institutions cannot avoid politics.  Afterall advocacy 
NGOs / CSOs cannot avoid being apolitical. What should be avoided by CSOs is 
the fight to get into state power.  That should be left to political parties.  This does 
not mean that CSOs that have undesirable intensions for the state and the society 
should be left to operate freely.  Necessary legal measures have to be taken. 
 
The implication of all this discussion on the relationship between the state and the 
civil society is that to what extent is the civil society free, independent and 
autonomous to enable it play the role of a weapon in the fight against corruption.  
Even if the relationship is mutual and harmonious whereby the civil society 
functions in partnership with the state, the civil society should be autonomous and 
vibrant so that it has the right power to fight against corruption be it grand or petty 
corruption without fear.   
 
It has to be noted, however, that some CSOs have began to make efforts to fight 
against corruption.  For example the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) is 
closely making follow-ups how Local Government development programmes are 
carried out with less corruption.  Recently three CSOs one of them being the 
National Organization for Legal Assistance (NOLA) have facilitated the fight 
against “Takrima”, a low that encouraged political corruption during elections.  
Eventually the High Court abolished that law.  Despite these minimal efforts, the 
Civil Society in Tanzania is still far from playing an effective role in the fight 
against corruption. 
24 “Takrima” is a Swahili word which means traditional African hospitality of welcoming and entertaining guests. 
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5. Conclusion and Recommendations: 
 5.1. Conclusion:  
This paper has at length discussed the situation of the growth of corruption 
in Tanzania and efforts which have so far been made by the government in 
the fight against it.  It has also discussed at length the position and role of 
the media and the civil society as weapons in the fight against corruption.  
It has also been observed that although these institutions have tried to play 
such a role but the level has still been very low.  The central problem is 
that the tradition of fighting against corruption is still very state-centred. 
 
Since the state-centred approach has not been successful in combating 
corruption not only in Tanzania but also in other African countries current 
thinking is that the state has to carry out that task through effective 
involvement of the media and the civil society.  This requires creation of a 
new legal, political and even socio-economic environment.  The change of 
environment should include the process of forging linkages between the 
media and the civil society, and the media and the civil society on one 
hand and the state on the other.  Within the context of such linkages the 
Parliament of Tanzania needs to play a vital role.  The Parliament of 
Tanzania has two advantages.  One it is the law-making body and 
therefore, it is in a position to facilitate the creation of a conducive legal 
and political environment.  The second advantage is that parliamentarians 
are representatives of the people.  It is, therefore, easy to facilitate the 
forging of links between the media and the civil society on one hand and 
the state on the other. 
 
In addition to forging linkages internally within Tanzania, Parliament 
should also forge linkages with other Parliaments in Africa and the World 
at large.  These efforts have began, as exemplified by the membership of 
the Tanzania Parliament to the African Parliamentarians Network Against 
Corruption (APNAC) and to the Global Organization of Parliamentarians 
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Against Corruption (GOPAC).  Since corruption is a national, regional and 
global problem it has to be fought against nationally, regionally and 
globally. 
 
5.2. Recommendations: 
a) At National Level: 
i) Promotion and strengthening civic education on the people 
to develop awareness of the situation of corruption. 
ii) Promotion of people centred democracy and good 
governance and transparency. 
iii) Ensuring fast and equitable socio-economic development. 
iv) Facilitating the developments of independent autonomous 
and responsible media and Civil Society Organizations. 
 
b) At International Level: 
i) Facilitating exchange of information on efforts and 
strategies between parliaments, the media and the civil 
society within Africa and the World at large. 
ii) Consolidation of existing organizations such as the PNAC 
and the GOPAC in the fight against corruption. 
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APPENDIX I 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AICC – The Arusha International Conference Centre  
APNAC – African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption. 
CBOs – Community Based Organizations 
CCM – Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) 
CGG – Campaign for Good Governance  
CHADEMA – Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (A Democratic and Development 
Party) 
CSOs – Civil Society Organizations  
CUF – Civil United Front. 
GGCU – Good Govemance Coordination Unit 
GOPAC – Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption  
GROs – Grassroot Organizations. 
JET – The Journalists Environmental Association. 
KNCU – Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union 
MCT – Media Council of Tanzania 
MDA – Ministry, Department and Agency 
MISA – Media Institute of Southern Africa. 
MOA – Media Owners Association  
NACSAP – The National Anti – Corruption Strategic Action Plan. 
NGO – Non Governmental Organization 
NOLA – National Organization for Legal Assistance 
NSTI – Nyegezi Social Training Institute  
OAU – Organization of African Unity 
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PAT – Photographers Association of Tanzania 
PCB - Prevention of Corruption Bureau  
RTD – Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam 
SABA – Southern African Broadcasting  Association 
SADC – Southern African Development Commission. 
SAP -    Structural Adjustment Programmes  
SAUT – St. Augustine University of Tanzania 
TAA – Tanganyika African Association 
TAMWA – Tanzania Media Women Association 
TANGO – Tanzania Association of Non Governmental Organizations.  
TCCIA – The Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture  
TCSA – Tanganyika Civil Servants Association  
TEMEYODA – The Tanzania Media Youth Development Association  
TFL – Tanganyika Federation of Labour. 
TSJ – Tanzania School of Journalism 
TUJ – Tanzania Union of Journalism  
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme 
URT – United Republic of Tanzania 
VAT – Value Added Tax 
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